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Abstract—This paper describes the development of
an auto-active verification technique in the Frama-C
framework. We outline the lemma functions method
and present the corresponding ACSL extension, its
implementation in Frama-C, and evaluation on a set
of string-manipulating functions from the Linux kernel.
We illustrate the benefits our approach can bring con-
cerning the effort required to prove lemmas, compared
to the approach based on interactive provers such as
Coq. Current limitations of the method and its imple-
mentation are discussed.
Index Terms—formal verification, deductive verifi-
cation, Frama-C, auto-active verification, lemma func-
tions, Linux kernel
I. Introduction
Deductive verification is one of the most “heavyweight”
static techniques of formal reasoning about software prop-
erties. It requires manual annotation of source code with
formal specifications and manual or semi-automatic proof
of conformance between code and specifications. Deductive
verification is applied in areas where the cost of error can
be too high. The main benefit of this approach is that
it can mathematically guarantee that code is free from
particular error classes.
In the toolsets based on the Hoare logic (such as Frama-
C [1], VeriFast [2], Dafny [3], GNATprove [4]), in order to
verify the correctness of a function, the verification engineer
is required to define a precondition — a predicate that
should hold in order for the following code to be functionally
correct and contain no runtime errors (i. e., models of
undefined behavior that are known to the verification tool),
a postcondition — a predicate that should hold after a
function execution and describe what this code should act
like to be functionally correct. Pre- and postconditions
form the function’s contract. Frame-conditions or effects
are sometimes viewed as a separate entity in the contract,
but typically they present a type of postcondition that
restrict the memory state of a program. A formal contract
is required to reason about the function’s correctness.
Given a formal contract, an engineer can try to prove that
a function conforms to its specification. To do this one needs
to additionally specify loop invariants and termination
expression (loop variants) in case the function under
analysis contains loops. Then the verification instrument
generates verification conditions (VCs), which can be
separated into categories: safety and behavioral ones.
Safety VCs are responsible for runtime error checks for
known (modeled) types, while behavioral VCs represent
the functional correctness checks. All VCs need to be
discharged in order for the function to be considered fully
proved (totally correct). This can be achieved either by
manually proving all VCs discharged with an interactive
prover (i. e., Coq, Isabelle/HOL or PVS) or with the help
of automatic provers.
It is well known that most problems related to verifying
the conformance between some code in basically any
practical programming language and its formal specification
in any sufficiently expressive specification language are
undecidable in general. The situation when an automatic
prover cannot discharge a verification condition is common.
This may be due to various reasons: limited time or
memory resources for the prover, an error in the code,
an incorrect formal specification, an incomplete formal
specification, an incapacity of the prover to finish the proof.
The specifications debugging is hard. Despite the modern
advances [5]–[7] in the field, the whole situation is still
poor when specifications become complex.
As it can be seen the whole process of deductive verifica-
tion requires a significant manual effort from a verification
engineer. This implies that practically all verification
tools have some capabilities for user interaction beyond
simply supplying the program and its specification. This
additional user interaction required to eventually prove
the correspondence between the code and its specification
is usually called the proof overhead. This overhead can
significantly depend on the way the user interaction is
accomplished in a particular verification tool. Even though
these ways can generally be very diverse, for simplicity we
dare to speculatively group them into the following three
major categories:
∙ External provers. The vast majority of verification
tools support this approach to user interaction at
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some point, be it as a part of a standard workflow or
as a last resort. The essence is that the verification
conditions (VCs) produced by the tool are translated
into the native language of some interactive proof
assistant, e. g., Coq, Isabelle/HOL or PVS. Then the
resulting theorems are proved using the capabilities of
the prover, sometimes with some extensions provided
by the verification tool, e. g., custom tactics. This
approach is often both simple and efficient, but for
some use cases, it has significant drawbacks such as
the ones we describe in this paper.
∙ Interactive proof editors. Some verification tools such
as WP plugin for Frama-C, Why3 verification plat-
form or KIV [8] verification system go further and
implement their own custom interactive proof manage-
ment facilities such as tactics, transformations, and
strategies. This is a hard yet powerful approach with
its own advantages and shortcomings. One of its major
disadvantages especially relevant to our particular case
is a high implementation overhead, which prevents
tentative adoption and quick preliminary evaluation
of the results.
∙ Auto-active proofs. One of the possible techniques
to reduce and automate the manual work and make
deductive verification more suitable for such meth-
ods as continuous verification [9]–[11] is auto-active
verification. The general idea is to express the proofs
in the same input language as the program and its
specification themselves relying on the Curry-Howard
correspondence between the programs and the proofs.
This approach is quite widely applied in particular
in such verification tools as Dafny [3], VeriFast [2],
GNATprove [12], and Why3 [13]. This is the approach
that we pursue and evaluate in this paper.
In this paper, we present our experience with integra-
tion of support for auto-active verification in ACSL [14],
Frama-C, and AstraVer deductive verification tool and
applying this approach to our existing set of specified
string-manipulating functions from the Linux kernel. We
demonstrate that integration of auto-active proofs to ACSL
and Frama-C is both beneficial and promising approach to
automated deductive verification that significantly reduces
manual proof overhead.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we give
an overview of the VerKer project and its specifications
and describe the problems we are solving by applying auto-
active verification to this project. Next, in Section III we
present the implementation of the technique in the Frama-
C framework and the AstraVer plugin. In Sections IV and V
we describe the obtained result and discuss future work on
open issues.
II. VerKer Project
The VerKer project [15] consists of standard library
functions taken from the Linux kernel. The main idea of
the project is to develop the correct and detailed ACSL [14]
specifications and fully prove these functions with the
Frama-C framework. Thus, evaluating the toolset (Frama-
C + AstraVer Plugin (a fork of Jessie) + Why3 + Solvers)
on the real code (not artificial examples) and highlighting
C idioms that are hard to describe with ACSL specification,
not possible to model with the deductive verification plugin,
or just giving the right direction for the tools development.
ACSL is a Behavioral Interface Specification Language
(BISL) [16] implemented in Frama-C. At the same time,
many higher-level formalisms for efficient specification
and verification of heap-manipulating or parallel programs
such as dynamic frames, separation logic, permissions,
rely/guarantee reasoning (e. g., ownership methodology),
specification refinement (e. g., function contract inclusion)
or auto-active verification are not included in ACSL.
Therefore ACSL is not tightly bound to any particular
verification methodology and support for its features can
significantly vary in tools.
A. Verification Approach
Specifications development is an iterative process. It
cannot be broadly described in the general case. Every
algorithm requires its own approach [17]–[20] with separate
axiomatizations fitting each particular case and implemen-
tation. A common way to write formal specifications is
to factor out the most complex logical statements into
theorems and lemmas so that the provers can discharge
the rest of the verification conditions automatically. The
theorems and lemmas are then proved manually with an
interactive prover. The main benefits of this approach are
the following:
∙ Lemmas are formulated in a more general way so
that they contain less implementation context specific
details (e. g., the assertion in a particular function).
This eases the process of their manual proving and
allows one to reuse them in multiple proofs of VCs
and other lemmas.
∙ In this case, lemmas are “aside from code”, thus
making formal specifications more maintainable and
tolerable to small code changes because they rarely
provoke changes in general statements.
The VerKer project adheres to this approach in the
ACSL specifications. The project currently contains 26
fully proved functions from Linux kernel library folder,
16 functions among them are string related (i. e., have
the str* prefix and perform operations on strings), and
7 are memory related (i. e., have mem* prefix). Only 9
functions (see Table I) contain in its formal specification a
logical function with lemmas formulated on it. The formal
contracts are written in a way to prove correspondence
between logical functions and C functions. The lemmas are
excessive, and provers sometimes can automatically prove
the correctness of a lemma based on other lemmas.
In the paper [15] it is claimed that the functions are
fully-proved but lemmas are not proved (only automatic
Function
Name
Number of
Lemmas
Proved
Automatically
Unproved
check_bytes8 3 3 0
strlen 10 4 6
skip_spaces 7 1 6
strchr 7 4 3
strchrnul 7 5 2
strspn 8 5 3
strcspn 5 2 3
strnlen 17 11 6
strpbrk 5 2 3
Total 69 37 32
TABLE I
Lemmas in the VerKer project
checks for contradiction was performed). The proving of
all lemmas in the project considered as a future work in
the paper.
B. Shortcomings and limitations
Thus we can found the following limitations of the
approach based on external provers:
∙ The use of external interactive proof assistants or
proof editors requires the users to get accustomed to
at least two different specification representations, cor-
responding languages and tools. This makes it harder
for the users to employ their skills acquired during
the process of specification within one verification
environment (e. g., the deductive verification plugin)
later in the process of proof within the other one
(e. g., the Coq proof assistant). In particular, the range
of supported language constructs can significantly dif-
fer. Many ACSL constructs such as pointer dereference
do not have direct counterparts in the language of the
interactive prover.
∙ The reproduction of external proofs requires the use of
external tools that work on their own representations
— yet the translations performed by the verification
tool in order to obtain the external representations can
cause various surprising instabilities, where the proof
suddenly fails after small supposedly irrelevant changes
are made to program source code or specifications.
This is especially well demonstrated by the pervasive
problem of generating unique, stable and predictable
names for various program and specification entities
such as variables and lemmas. For instance, when
a lemma or variable is renamed, the proofs have to
be adjusted accordingly, yet the relation between the
names used in the original program and the names
used in the proofs can be quite complex.
∙ The external proofs are kept separately from the
specifications and are therefore not directly available
to the reader of the verified program. This can make it
harder to estimate the effort needed for modification of
certain parts of the program or specification or to keep
the proofs in sync with the program and specification.
∙ The use of external interactive provers prevents an ap-
plication of various encodings optimized for automatic
provers, e. g., SMT-solvers since the VCs should remain
manageable by different tools that apply different
tactics or decision procedures. In particular, while
SMT solvers efficiently handle large ground (quantifier-
free) formulas modulo theories, most interactive tools
are much more suitable to handle smaller formulas in
higher-order logic.
∙ External proofs introduce additional problems of proof
location and sharing when the same lemma is included
or imported in several source code files.
III. Auto-active Proofs
According to its original definition in [21], auto-active
verification is any verification technique where user input
is supplied before VC generation. The user input can
be given in various forms including but not limited to:
auxiliary annotations such as verifier pragmas, triggers,
ad-hoc lemma instantiations, ghost code, and lemma
functions. Among those, lemma functions are a primary tool
intended to convey proofs of user-defined auxiliary lemmas.
The proofs are expressed as ordinary pure (i. e., without
side-effects) total (i. e., always successfully terminating)
imperative functions. Though the execution of pure total
imperative code does not produce any observable effects
with respect to the programming language semantics, when
interpreted by the verification tool the instructions of the
code can produce a substantial effect on its internal state
or the internal state of the automatic theorem prover. In
particular, through the process of VCs generation, the
proof-carrying code can determine the fragment of current
proof context that is explicitly known to the verifier or the
prover versus the fragment that is only known implicitly as
a set of derivable inferences. As most of the logic relevant
to deductive verification is generally undecidable, neither
the verifier nor the prover can ever explore all propositions
derivable in the current context. The code of the lemma
functions thus serves as a guide for the verification tool
that efficiently indicates the relevant parts of the search
space. One of the most significant cases where verification
tools need such a guide is with inductive proofs as they
have very limited support in automatic provers.
Consider the following inductive proof expressed as a
lemma function:
logic char * strchrnul(char * 𝑠, char 𝑐) =
*𝑠 ≡ 𝑐 ? 𝑠 :
*𝑠 ≡ ′∖0′ ? 𝑠 :
𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑙(𝑠+ 1, 𝑐);
. . .
/*@ ghost
@ /@ lemma
@ @ requires 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑_𝑠𝑡𝑟(𝑠);
@ @ decreases 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑒𝑛(𝑠);
@ @ ensures 𝑠 ≤ 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑙(𝑠, 𝑐) ≤ 𝑠𝑡𝑟 + 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑒𝑛(𝑠);
@ @/
@ void 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑙_𝑖𝑛_𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒(char * 𝑠, char 𝑐)
@ {
@ if (*𝑠 ! = ′∖0′ && *𝑠 ! = 𝑐)
@ 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑙_𝑖𝑛_𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒(𝑠+ 1, 𝑐);
@ }
@*/
The lemma and its proof are expressed within a single
recursive function definition 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑙_𝑖𝑛_𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒. The
induction here is simple as it exactly follows the recursive
definition of the logic function 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑢𝑙. The pre-condition
of the function requires the parameter string 𝑠 to be a
valid C string so that it has a well-defined finite length.
Then the if statement in the function body splits between
the base and inductive cases. In the base cases *𝑠 == ′∖0′
and *𝑠 == 𝑐 the post-condition trivially follows from the
definition of the function 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑙. In the inductive case,
which corresponds to the body of the if statement, the
post-condition follows from the inductive assumption for
strings of a smaller length and an additional instance
of a lemma about the length of the string 𝑠 + 1 that
is implicitly present in the proof context (this lemma is
actually also proved by a lemma function that is provided
earlier in the code). The recursion is well-founded since in
the only recursive call the value of the variant 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑒𝑛(𝑠)
specified in the decreases clause is strictly smaller than
that in the caller function. With the AstraVer plugin, the
correctness of the function 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑙_𝑖𝑛_𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 can be
verified automatically by discharging all the VCs using an
SMT solver such as Alt-Ergo or CVC4. The automatic
proofs require no induction and only a few quantifier
instantiations, while all the necessary terms are explicitly
present in the VCs. So in either solver, the verification
takes far less than a second.
Now since the function 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑙_𝑖𝑛_𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 is proved
correct for arbitrary values of its parameters, and since
the function is pure and total, the statement about its
correctness with respect to the contract can be expressed
as the following lemma:
lemma 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑙_𝑖𝑛_𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 :
∀char * 𝑠, char 𝑐;
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑_𝑠𝑡𝑟(𝑠) =⇒
𝑠 ≤ 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑙(𝑠, 𝑐) ≤ 𝑠𝑡𝑟 + 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑒𝑛(𝑠);
This lemma can be automatically generated from the
function contract and used in the proofs later in the
program code, both explicitly by the user by calling
the function 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑙_𝑖𝑛_𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 with some concrete
arguments or implicitly by the SMT solver by instantiating
the lemma with some concrete terms.
This is the basic idea of lemma functions and their use.
Now let us consider our approach to the integration of
lemma function into ACSL in particular. We first present
our existing approach and current results that we obtained
by using it, and then we discuss some of its limitations and
possible directions of future developments.
A. Integrating Lemma Functions Into ACSL/Frama-C
In our fork of the Frama-C platform developed as
part of the AstraVer toolset, we implemented relatively
simple support for lemma functions as a special case of
total pure ghost functions. Both ACSL specification and
its implementation in mainline Frama-C provide support
for ghost functions. Meanwhile, the AstraVer plugin is
able to generate VCs to check ACSL assigns, allocates,
decreases and terminates clauses of function contracts.
So the only missing part to provide basic support for lemma
functions was the automatic generation of lemmas and their
implicit importing in all the code functions located further
in the source code.
More concretely, in order to allow lemma functions to
be used in a similar way to regular ACSL lemmas (which
can only be written in logic), we introduced a new lemma
keyword for C function specifications.
Our modified version of Frama-C processes it in the
following way:
∙ For a function contract of the form
/@ requires 𝑅(𝑝1, . . . , 𝑝𝑛, 𝑔1, . . . , 𝑔𝑛);
@ ensures 𝐸(𝑝1, . . . , 𝑝𝑛, 𝑔1, . . . , 𝑔𝑛, ∖𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡);
@/,
where 𝑝1, . . . , 𝑝𝑛 are function parameters, 𝑔1, . . . , 𝑔𝑛
are global variables and the special variable ∖𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 de-
notes the return value of the function, a corresponding
axiom is generated, that is, an axiom of the form
∀typeof(𝑝1) 𝑝1, . . . , typeof(𝑝𝑛) 𝑝𝑛,
typeof(𝑔1) 𝑔1, . . . , typeof(𝑔𝑛) 𝑔𝑛;
∃typeof(∖𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡) ∖𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡;
𝑅(𝑝1, . . . , 𝑝𝑛, 𝑔1, . . . , 𝑔𝑛) =⇒
𝐸(𝑝1, . . . , 𝑝𝑛, 𝑔1, . . . , 𝑔𝑛, ∖𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡);
∙ All logic definitions such as functions, predicates, ax-
ioms, and lemmas in ACSL are grouped into axiomatic
blocks. The generated axiom is placed in a new ax-
iomatic block. AstraVer implements on-demand import
of all the definitions from axiomatic blocks based on
occurrences of symbols defined in the axiomatic. As
the axiom name cannot be directly used in an ACSL
specification, the axiom is not included in any proof
context until some other symbol in this new axiomatic
is defined and later used in another specification (code
function or another axiomatic block). In particular,
this approach removes the axiom from the context of
the lemma function itself, preventing the axiom from
trivially proving the function’s verification conditions.
∙ A dummy identically true predicate with a unique
name is generated, and its definition is added into the
new axiomatic block.
∙ A precondition requiring the dummy predicate from
the new axiomatic block is inserted into the contracts
of all function located after the currently processed
lemma function, which causes the definitions from the
axiomatic block (including the generated axiom) to
be imported into the proof context of these functions.
As the dummy predicate is generated by the tool and
has a unique name, the user cannot access it and thus
create any extra dependencies disrupting the ordering
of lemma proofs according to their code locations.
∙ The lemma function itself gets some additional clauses
inserted into its contract specification:
– assigns ∖𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔; allocates ∖𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 — to en-
sure the function is pure (i. e., it does not touch any
global state);
– terminates ∖𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒; – to prevent abrupt termination
(i. e., calls to exit(), abort() etc.) — loop and
recursion termination is already required by default
in the AstraVer plugin.
An alternative approach enforcing the topological or-
dering of lemma functions has been considered: explicit
removal of the axiom from the context of the functions
located before the lemma body. This is possible to achieve
using the meta remove_prop pragma in the generated
Why3ML model. However, this would have required Frama-
C to track the connection between the function and the
axiom explicitly, and the AstraVer plugin to use that
connection to generate the meta statement in the WhyML
output. A minimal implementation that fully translates
lemma functions into existing specification entities was
chosen in the end.
IV. Results
Even though at the previous stage of out project [15] we
ended up with 32 unproved lemmas, we did not attempt to
match our lemma function proofs at this stage exactly with
the lemmas used at the previous stage. Instead, the goal was
to ensure all the code can be verified without resorting to
any additional assumptions by completely replacing all the
lemmas involved with a minimum required set of lemma
functions. Thus we ended up with 31 lemma functions
required to fully prove the VCs for some code functions as
presented in Table II.
Unfortunately, a thorough comparison of the proof
overhead between the interactive and auto-active proofs
turned out to be very hard. The current support for
interactive proofs that existed in AstraVer plugin was quite
basic, which resulted in considerably large manual proofs.
The reduction of these proofs seems only possible with very
significant implementation effort including implementation
of relevant custom tactics and optimizing the VC generation
for manual proofs. For the reference, we provide an
illustrative comparison of an interactive auto-active proof of
a single lemma in Figure 1 as it can be performed with the
current implementation. This example shows the reduction
in proof overhead of more than tenfold, yet a different
more optimized manual proof augmented with appropriate
Function
Name
Number of
Ghost
Functions
Number of
Lemma
Functions
strlen 4 2
skip_spaces 1 3
strchr 0 5
strchrnul 0 5
strspn 1 5
strcspn 0 3
strnlen 3 6
strpbrk 0 2
Total 9 31
TABLE II
Lemma functions
custom tactics could potentially result in a much smaller
number.
However, in the context of our project, the use of lemma
functions became a decisive choice that enabled complete,
practical, stable and future-proof verification of auxiliary
lemmas with minimal implementation effort. The ability to
instantiate lemmas by explicitly calling the corresponding
lemma functions and the availability of all general C
constructs in the proof code provided the verification
engineer with sufficient control. By these means in our
examples we were able to reduce the verification time of
each lemma function (cumulative time of the solvers on all
function’s VCs) to a few seconds.
V. Open Issues and Future Work
A. Logic types and expressions in code
Unlike many specification languages originally developed
with auto-active verification in mind, ACSL maintains a
clear distinction between code and specification languages.
In particular, C and logic types as well as C and logic
expressions are represented entirely separately within the
Frama-C kernel and are only allowed in their respective
positions. Therefore lemma functions cannot be directly
used to prove the lemmas with quantification over logic
types. This limitation can be overcome in individual cases of
quantified logic variables ranging over the domains bounded
by C values.
For universal quantification of the form
∀ L 𝑣; 𝑣1 ≤ 𝑣 < 𝑣2 =⇒ 𝑃 (𝑣),
where 𝑣1 and 𝑣2 are C values of type C a proof can be
accomplished through the use of an auxiliary lemma
aux: ∀ C 𝑣; 𝑣1 ≤ 𝑣 < 𝑣2 =⇒ 𝑃 (𝑣),
which can then be generalized using a dummy proof of the
1 Theorem Strchr_skipped :
2 ∀ voidP_str_0_30_alloc_table_at_L: alloc_table voidP,
3 ∀ charP_charM_str_0_30_at_L : map (pointer voidP) Int8.t,
4 ∀ str_0_0 : pointer voidP,
5 ∀ c_1_0 : Int8 . t ,
6 ∀ i_0_0 : Uint64. t ,
7 valid_str
8 str_0_0
9 voidP_str_0_30_alloc_table_at_L
10 charP_charM_str_0_30_at_L ∧
11 strchr
12 str_0_0
13 c_1_0
14 charP_charM_str_0_30_at_L ̸=(null : pointer voidP) ∧
15 Uint64. infix_lseq (Uint64.of_int 0%Z) i_0_0 ∧
16 (Uint64. to_int i_0_0 < sub_pointer
17 (strchr
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18 str_0_0
19 c_1_0
20 charP_charM_str_0_30_at_L)
21 str_0_0))%Z →
22 get
23 charP_charM_str_0_30_at_L
24 (shift str_0_0 (Uint64.to_int i_0_0)) ̸=c_1_0.
25 (* Why3 intros
26 voidP_str_0_30_alloc_table_at_L
27 charP_charM_str_0_30_at_L
28 str_0_0 c_1_0 i_0_0
29 (h1,( h2,( h3,( h4,h5)))). *)
30 intros
31 voidP_str_4_82_alloc_table_at_L
32 charP_charM_str_4_82_at_L
33 str_4 c_4_0 i_1
34 (h1,( h2,(h3,(h4,h5)))).
35
36 Definition P (i : int ) :=
37 ∀ a : alloc_table voidP,
38 ∀ m : map (pointer voidP) Int8 . t ,
39 ∀ s : pointer voidP,
40 ∀ c : Int8 . t ,
41 valid_str s a m ∧
42 strchr s c m ̸=(null : pointer voidP) ∧
43 (0 ≤ i )%Z ∧
44 (i < sub_pointer (strchr s c m) s)%Z →
45 get m (shift s i ) ̸= c.
46 specialize Wf_Z.natlike_rec3 with (P := P) as Ind.
47 assert (P 0) as Base.
48 unfold P.
49 intros a m s c Valid .
50 unfold not.
. . .
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭ 13
lin
es
58 rewrite First in Valid .
59 rewrite Sub_pointer_self in Valid .
60 omega.
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
93
lin
es
of
us
er
pr
oo
f
61 assert (∀ z : int , (0 < z)%Z → P (Z.pred z) → P z) as Step.
62 intros z Gt0 Pred.
63 unfold P.
64 intros a m s c Valid .
. . .
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭ 55
lin
es
114 apply Strchr_same_block with
115 (voidP_s_4_26_alloc_table_at_L := a).
116 tauto .
117 assert (∀ z : int , (0 ≤z)%Z → P z) as Lemma.
118 apply Ind. 1,2: tauto .
119 unfold P in Lemma.
120 apply Lemma with (a := voidP_str_4_82_alloc_table_at_L).
121 unfold Uint64. infix_lseq in h3.
122 rewrite Uint64.Of_int in h3.
. . .
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ 8lin
es
127 unfold Uint64. in_bounds. omega.
128 tauto .
129 Qed.
1 /*@ ghost
2 @ /@ lemma
3 @ @ requires 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑_𝑠𝑡𝑟(𝑠𝑡𝑟);
4 @ @ requires 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟(𝑠𝑡𝑟, 𝑐) ̸= ∖𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙;
5 @ @ requires 0 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟(𝑠𝑡𝑟, 𝑐)− 𝑠𝑡𝑟;
6 @ @ decreases 𝑖;
7 @ @ ensures 𝑠𝑡𝑟[𝑖] ̸= 𝑐;
8 @ @/
9 @ void strchr_sk ipped ( char ∗ s t r , char c ,
10 @ size_t i )
11 @ {
12 @ i f ( i > 0 && ∗ s t r != ’ \0 ’ && ∗ s t r != c )
13 @ strchr_sk ipped ( s t r + 1 , c , i − 1 ) ;
14 @ }
15 @∗/
Fig. 1. Proofs of lemma strchr_skipped. Coq proof on the left. Auto-active proof with lemma function on the right.
form
/@ lemma
@ ensures ∀ L 𝑣; 𝑣1 ≤ 𝑣 < 𝑣2 =⇒ 𝑃 (𝑣);
@/
void gen() {
/@ loop invariant 𝑣1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑣2;
@ loop invariant ∀ C 𝑗; 𝑣1 ≤ 𝑗 < 𝑖 =⇒ 𝑃 (𝑗);
@/
for (C i = v1; i < v2; i++)
𝑎𝑢𝑥(𝑖);
}
For logic expressions 𝑙(𝑢) ranging over the C values
𝑣1 ≤ 𝑙(𝑢) < 𝑣2, where 𝑢 are C expressions, a proxy C
function can be introduced:
/*@ ensures ∖𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 ≡ 𝑙(𝑢);
@ assigns ∖𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔;
@*/
C 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦(𝑢);
Note that 𝑙(𝑢) may contain logic constructs that are thus
encapsulated by the proxy. In general, proxies should
be introduced carefully as their post-conditions are not
checked and may introduce inconsistencies, but in some
cases, the proxy can be given an implementation (definition)
that satisfies the corresponding specification. In our proofs,
we only introduced proxies with definitions.
Ultimately, the proper support for logic types and
expressions in the ghost code should be added to ACSL
specification and implemented in Frama-C to fully support
auto-active proofs with lemma functions.
B. Lemma functions and axiomatics
Normally, lemmas in ACSL are grouped into axiomatic
blocks. However, axiomatic blocks cannot include code.
Therefore, lemma functions cannot be directly grouped
into axiomatic blocks. Moreover, allowing lemma functions
to be declared as lemmas in axiomatic blocks introduces a
problem with ordering of proofs. To be well-founded, the
lemma functions should be split into strongly connected
components and topologically ordered. However, unlike
code functions that can only be called explicitly, lemmas
can be instantiated implicitly, provided they are preset in
the proof context. When each lemma function has just a
single definition, the definition order of lemma functions
can serve as their required topological order, with an only
additional restriction that mutually recursive functions
should be somehow declared simultaneously. However, when
lemma functions are allowed to have separate declarations
and definitions, the ordering of lemma functions becomes
generally unspecified. In the current implementation, the
lemma functions are allowed to have separate declarations,
but they are later grouped into strongly connected com-
ponents, and the definition of the first function in the
component is then used for topological ordering. This
essentially simulates simultaneous definitions. However, this
approach is completely ignorant of the lemma declarations
grouped into axiomatic blocks. Ultimately, instead of
choosing between the declaration and the definition points
to be used for topological ordering, we propose including
the lemma function definitions (bodies) into the axiomatic
blocks directly. The ordering then can be retained as in
the current implementation. However, this would be a
significant change to the ACSL specification.
C. Proof reuse and higher-order logic
Careful consideration of the resulting auto-active proofs
from our study reveals that many of them are very
similar to each other and represent instances of some more
general proof patterns. In general, it is natural to express
such more general lemmas and their proofs using higher-
order logic (HOL). However, the support for higher-order
reasoning in SMT-based deductive verification tools such
as Jessie or AstraVer is usually very limited due to the
inherent incompleteness of decision procedures for HOLs.
An alternative solution to direct support for HOL would be
a stratified solution, where the core specification language
does not support any HOL constructs, but a separate
higher-level language such as the language of modules does
provide constructs that can be used to express and prove
higher-order propositions. This approach is already used
in Why3ML specification language. Let us illustrate this
approach on two example lemmas from our study:
logic char * strchr(char * 𝑠, char 𝑐) =
*𝑠 ≡ 𝑐 ? 𝑠 :
*𝑠 ≡ ′∖0′ ? (char*)∖𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 : 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟(𝑠+ 1, 𝑐);
lemma strchr_skipped :
∀char * 𝑠, 𝑐, size_t 𝑖;
valid_str(𝑠) ∧
strchr(𝑠, 𝑐) ̸≡ ∖𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∧
0 ≤ 𝑖 < strchr(𝑠, 𝑐)− 𝑠 =⇒
𝑠[𝑖] ̸≡ 𝑐;
. . .
logic char * strchrnul(char * 𝑠, char 𝑐) =
*𝑠 ≡ 𝑐 ? 𝑠 :
*𝑠 ≡ ′∖0′ ? 𝑠 : 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑙(𝑠+ 1, 𝑐);
lemma strchrnul_skipped :
∀char * 𝑠, 𝑐, size_t 𝑖;
valid_str(𝑠) ∧
0 ≤ 𝑖 < strchrnul(𝑠, 𝑐)− 𝑠 =⇒
𝑠[𝑖] ̸≡ 𝑐;
Currently, the lemmas have to be proved as two separate
lemma functions. Though there is a single generic function
that suits both cases, its definition makes use of higher-
order features :
logic char * strchrcomb(boolean 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑(char * 𝑠, char 𝑐),
char * 𝑑𝑓𝑡(char * 𝑠),
char * 𝑠, char 𝑐) =
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑(𝑠, 𝑐) ? 𝑠 : *𝑠 ≡ ′∖0′ ? 𝑑𝑓𝑡(𝑠, 𝑐) : 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏(𝑠+ 1, 𝑐);
Within the stratified approach, this function should be
placed in a separate module alongside the functions cor-
responding to its parameters, auxiliary definitions, and
appropriate lemmas:
predicate 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑(char * 𝑠, char 𝑐) reads * 𝑠;
logic char * 𝑑𝑓𝑡(char * 𝑠);
predicate 𝑑𝑓𝑡_𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 = ∀char * 𝑠; 𝑑𝑓𝑡(𝑠) ≡ 𝑠;
predicate 𝑑𝑓𝑡_𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 = ∀char * 𝑠; 𝑑𝑓𝑡(𝑠) ≡ ∖𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙;
logic char * 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏(char * 𝑠, char 𝑐) =
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑(𝑠, 𝑐) ? 𝑠 :
*𝑠 ≡ ′∖0′ ? 𝑑𝑓𝑡(𝑠) :
𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏(𝑠+ 1, 𝑐);
lemma 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏_𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑑 :
∀char * 𝑠, 𝑐, size_t 𝑖;
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑_𝑠𝑡𝑟(𝑠) ∧
(𝑑𝑓𝑡_𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 ∨ 𝑑𝑓𝑡_𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∧ 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏(𝑠, 𝑐) ̸≡ ∖𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙) ∧
0 ≤ 𝑖 < strchrcomb(𝑠, 𝑐)− 𝑠 =⇒
!𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑(𝑠+ 𝑖, 𝑐);
Then the lemmas can be proved in the general case as usual,
e. g., by using lemma-functions. The resulting module can
be instantiated by providing concrete definitions for logic
functions 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 and 𝑑𝑓𝑡 to obtain both logic functions 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟
and 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑙. Upon instantiation, their corresponding
lemmas do not have to be proven, and they can be safely
instantiated directly into axioms.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we propose the implementation of auto-
active proofs technique in the Frama-C framework and
AstraVer plugin, evaluate our implementation on VerKer
project specifications by proving all string-related lemmas,
and demonstrate the benefits of the approach by comparing
it with manual lemma proofs in Coq.
The results of the work are publicly available. The
source code with specifications and verification protocols
are available as a part of the VerKer project. The proofs
are easy reproducible since there is a configuration of a
continuous integration system. The modified toolset is
available on the AstraVer project page.
The obtained results show the approach is very promising
and should be adopted in the mainline of AstraVer toolset.
Auto-active verification in Frama-C ease the work of a ver-
ification engineer, make specifications more maintainable
and potentially can lower the cost of deductive verification.
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